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A commentary on
Planning to reach for an object changes
how the reacher perceives it
by Vishton, P. M., Stephens, N. J., Nelson, L.
A., Morra, S. E., Brunick, K. L., and Stevens,
J. A. (2007). Psychol. Sci. 18, 713–719. doi:
10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01965.x
A now-famous study by Aglioti et al.
(1995) involves a graspable version of
the Ebbinghaus illusion (Figure 1). Aglioti
and colleagues constructed a 3D version of
the illusion, using thin solid disks. Subjects
were asked to pick up the central disk on
the left if the two central disks appeared
identical in size, and to pick up the central
disk on the right if they appeared different
in size. The experimenters varied the rela-
tive sizes of the two target disks randomly
so that in some trials physically differ-
ent disks appeared perceptually identical
in size, while in other trials physically iden-
tical disks appeared perceptually different
in size. In selecting a disk in either trial
condition, Milner and Goodale observe,
FIGURE 1 | The Ebbinghaus Illusion. The disk on the left looks typically looks about 10% smaller
than the disk on the right.
“subjects indicated their susceptibility to
the visual illusion” (1995/2006, p. 168):
that is, their choice of which disk to pick up
was determined by its apparent size rather
than its real one. Nonetheless, the effect
of the illusion was significantly less pro-
nounced with respect to action, as mea-
sured by maximum grip aperture (MGA)
in prehension, than with respect to con-
scious perceptual estimation (PE), as mea-
sured by the distance between thumb and
forefinger in amanual estimate of disk size.
Although the disk surrounded by small
circles in the illusion display typically looks
about 10% larger than the disk surrounded
by large circles, the increase in MGA when
reaching for the former disk exhibited a
magnitude of around only 6%.
According to proponents of the dual
systemsmodel of visual processing (Milner
and Goodale, 1995/2006), the illusion has
a different effect on visual awareness than
on visually guided grasping because the
former makes use of different sources of
visuospatial information than the latter.
On this model, how the size of an object
appears in conscious vision should not
influence grip aperture, and, conversely,
how the size of the object is represented by
motor systems that guide grasping should
not influence representation of its size in
conscious vision.
At variance with this idea, however,
Vishton et al. (2007) (experiment 3) found
that the act of reaching for a disk in a
3D version of Ebbinghaus illusion sig-
nificantly diminished the magnitude of
the effect on subsequent PE for several
minutes after reaching trials had ended
(5.74% for PE vs. 6.10% for grasping).
Strikingly, they also found (experiment 2)
that when subjects were merely informed
prior to engaging in PE trials that they
would subsequently be required to grasp
the disk that appeared larger, the effect of
the illusion on PE was significantly dimin-
ished (6.18% for PE vs. 5.54% for grasp-
ing). “Simply listening to a description of
a reaching task,” Vishton and co-authors
write, “seems to affect size perception”
(Vishton et al., 2007, p. 718).
These findings suggest that the phe-
nomenal contents of visual experience can
be cognitively penetrated: high-level infor-
mation originating outside of the visual
system seems to modulate the way an
object’s size visually appears. There are dif-
ferent possible mechanisms whereby such
penetration might occur. Vishton and co-
authors propose that “intending to reach
for a target changes how the reacher per-
ceives it” and that “action choice changes
the nature of visual size perception” (p.
718). But how does action selection have
this effect? One possibility (a) is that
an abstract, high-level intention to act—
either a “distal” or “proximal” intention
in the sense of Pacherie (2008)—somehow
exerts a direct influence on PE, say, by
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changing the relative weightings assigned
by the visual system to sources of depth
information such as binocular dispar-
ity, vergence, accommodation, and rela-
tive size. Since size estimation depends, in
part, on perceived distance in depth, this
could explain the influence of intention
on perception. A second possibility (b) is
that the relevant effect is brought about
via lower-level motor representations that
implement and provide kinematic and
dynamical specification for the subject’s
high-level intention. This would arguably
still count as a case of cognitive penetra-
tion if the lower-level, action-specifying
motor representations carried information
from the subject’s high-level intention that
influenced relative cue weighting or other
visual computations. As Wu (2013) writes,
“The key [to cognitive penetration of
vision by intention] is not directness of
link but (internal) informational transfer
of an appropriate kind” (p. 662). A third
possibility (c) looks to motor imagery
elicited in the course of both experiments
for the source of penetration. Possibility
(c), however, is not entirely distinct from
(a) and (b), since there is evidence that
internally rehearsing the performance of
an action activates representations at all
levels in the motor processing hierarchy
(for reviews, see Decety and Grèzes, 2006;
Jeannerod, 2006). A final possibility (d) is
that the effect is not due to motor repre-
sentations at all, but rather to the subject’s
beliefs concerning the action that she has
been requested to perform. 1 Future stud-
ies will have to investigate which, if any, of
these four explanations best accounts for
the intriguing effects that Vishton and his
co-authors have reported.
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